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Mark E. Nissen and Richard M. Burton
Abstract—Fit represents a central concept for organizational
design, but extant research maintains a static focus on fit, a focus
that is incommensurate with the fundamentally dynamic nature
of organizations and their environments. Most key organizational
environments are inherently dynamic; hence, the corresponding
organizational designs required for fit are necessarily dynamic
too. The problem is, the dynamics of fit are not addressed well
by extant theory in organization and management sciences. Al-
ternatively, organizations can be viewed as systems of purposeful
design, and designing organizations to maintain fit and respond
to dynamic environments over time may be informed well by
theory and practice in engineering fields where such design is
well established. In this paper, we abstract to the level of airplane
design, and we utilize the dynamical language and integrated
system of concepts, definitions, and interrelationships from the en-
gineering field Aerodynamics to extend organization and manage-
ment sciences and address the problem of organizational design
in a dynamic context. We begin with a focused summary of the
literature regarding the nature of organizational fitness. We then
outline a conceptual model adapted to organizational design from
Aerodynamics, and we summarize the key aerodynamics concepts
stability and maneuverability to inform our conceptualization in
terms of both airplane and organization design. This paper enables
us to articulate a set of propositions and measures that form a basis
for empirical testing. This paper also reveals important, dynamic
organizational design tradeoffs and implications, and it shows how
such conceptualization can elucidate new insights via comparison
with and extension to extant theory.
Index Terms—Contingency Theory, dynamics, engineering, fit,
organizational design.
I. INTRODUCTION
FOR more than a half century, fit—which Donaldson [1]defines as a match “. . . between the organization struc-
ture and contingency factors that has a positive effect on
performance” [1, pp. 7–10]—has been a central concept for
organizational design. Beginning with seminal works by Burns
and Stalker [2], Woodward [3], Lawrence and Lorsch [4], and
others, organization and management theory has been guided
by the understanding that no single approach to organizing is
best in all circumstances. Lawrence and Lorsch [5] indicate
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that the “general notion of fit has become almost axiomatic”
[5, p. xii] in modern studies of organization and management
sciences.
Moreover, myriad empirical studies (e.g., [6]–[9]; cf., [10]
and [11]) in the organization and management sciences have
confirmed and reconfirmed that poor organizational fit de-
grades performance, and many diverse organizational structures
[e.g., Functional, Decentralized, Mixed (see [12])], forms [e.g.,
Bureaucracy (see [13]); M-Form (see [14]); Network (see [15]);
Clan (see [16]); Virtual (see [17]); Platform (see [18])], con-
figurations [e.g., Machine Bureaucracy, Simple Structure, Pro-
fessional Bureaucracy, Divisionalized Form, Adhocracy (see
[19])], and other groupings1 have been theorized to enhance fit.
Quite simply, fit is a central concept in organizational design.
However, extant research maintains a static focus on fit; a
focus that is incommensurate with the fundamentally dynamic
nature of organizations and their environments [1], [20]. Most
key organizational environments are inherently dynamic [21];
hence, the corresponding organizational designs required for
fit are necessarily dynamic too [22]. This highlights the im-
portance of research focusing on the design of organizations
to maintain fit and respond to dynamic contingencies over
time. The problem is, the dynamics of fit are not addressed
well by extant theory in organization and management sciences
[23], [24].
Alternatively, organizations can be viewed as systems of
purposeful design, and designing organizations to maintain
fit and respond to dynamic environments over time may be
informed well by theory and practice in engineering fields
where such design is well established. For instance, human-
activity systems such as organizations, and engineered physical
systems such as airplanes, bridges, and computers, all represent
classes of systems [25] and share attributes at some levels of
abstraction. The key is to find an appropriate level of abstraction
for organizational design to benefit from well-established engi-
neering knowledge (e.g., applied generally to physical systems)
yet to account for essential idiosyncrasies of organizations (e.g.,
unique aspects of human-activity systems).
In this paper, we abstract to the level of airplane design,
and we utilize the dynamical language and integrated system
of concepts, definitions, and interrelationships from the engi-
neering field Aerodynamics to extend organization and man-
agement sciences and address the problem of organizational
1As a note, although we recognize differences in meaning between terms
such as organizational structure, form, configuration and others [40], [45], [97];
unless the specific meaning is important to our argument, in this paper, we use
them interchangeably for the most part.
1083-4427/$26.00 © 2010 IEEE
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL CONCEPTS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS
design in a dynamic context. The airplane abstraction enables
us to examine organizational design in terms of a controlled
system that is subject to environmental dynamics. Moreover,
the dynamical language of Aerodynamics enables us to obviate
the static concept fit by developing organizational analogs to the
fundamentally dynamic concepts stability and maneuverability,
and its integrated system of concepts, definitions, and interrela-
tionships inform the design directly and concisely.
To base this discussion on extant theory, we begin with a
focused summary of the organization and management sciences
literature regarding the nature of organizational fitness. This
literature—in which most scholarly discussion of organiza-
tional design and fit takes place—is likely to be unfamiliar to
many readers with engineering backgrounds. We then outline
a conceptual model adapted to organizational design from
Aerodynamics, and we summarize the key aerodynamics con-
cepts stability and maneuverability to inform our conceptual-
ization in terms of both airplane and organization design. These
aerodynamics concepts—which are very well established in
engineering theory and practice—are likely to be unfamiliar to
many readers with organization and management backgrounds.
Hence, our interdisciplinary discussion seeks to serve and
inform readers from both engineering and organization and
management. In turn, we articulate a set of propositions
and measures that form a basis for empirical testing. This
work reveals important dynamic organizational design tradeoffs
and implications, and it shows how such conceptualization can
elucidate new insights via comparison with and extension to
extant theory.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we begin with a focused summary of the
organization and management sciences literature regarding the
nature of dynamic fit. To guide this discussion, Table I sum-
marizes the principal concepts, assumptions, and limitations
concerning the study of organizational fitness. To begin, we
draw from Donaldson [1] for the fundamental definition of fit
that centers on matching the design of an organization with its
key factors that affect performance.
The next proponents introduce and discuss the term con-
tingency to characterize key factors that affect organizational
performance. They explain that there is no single organiza-
tional design that is best in all circumstances (i.e., across all
contingencies), and they illustrate how various organizations
are and should be designed and changed to fit specific contin-
gency contexts. For instance, organizational environment is a
fundamental contingency factor for organizational design [2],
[26]–[28], with alternate environmental characteristics (e.g.,
complexity, change) related contingently with different organi-
zational structures [e.g., Functional, Decentralized (see [12])].
Among others, organizational technology has been studied
extensively as a powerful contingency factor also [3], [29],
[30], with alternate technological characteristics (e.g., task vari-
ability, problem analyzability) related contingently with differ-
ent organizational forms [e.g., Craft, Engineering (see [31])].
The principally exogenous focus of contingencies along these
lines lacks explanatory power, particularly where management
is viewed as working to purposefully maneuver and control
organizations through endogenous activities.
In addition to exogenous contingency factors along these
lines [e.g., including environmental shocks, technological
shifts, and regulatory changes (see [32]–[34])], organizational
forms are and should be designed and changed to fit endoge-
nous contingency contexts as well, such as strategic choice
[35]–[37], cultural change [38] and management intervention
[39], [40]. Fit with endogenous contingencies is just as impor-
tant as with their exogenous counterparts [41], [42].
Particularly, through the early phases of this research, the
concept organizational fit has been treated in a unidimensional
manner for the most part; that is, the early concept has
been limited largely to describing fit between a specific
organizational structure (e.g., Functional or Divisional) and a
single contingency factor (e.g., organizational environment or
strategy). However, scholars have identified an array of multiple
contingency factors (e.g., age, environment, size, strategy, and
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technology), which are often conflicting [43]. As such, they
must be addressed simultaneously as a multicontingency set
[44] through holistic coherent organizational designs [45]
composed of internally congruent elements [46].
Further, building recently upon such research, Burton et al.
[41] identify a coherent set of 14 contingency factors (e.g., goal,
strategy, and environment) that an organization must address
in an integrated manner, and they explain how the specific
contingency set facing a given organization can be expected
to change through time; that is, the contingency context of
organizational design is not static. Contingencies—and, hence,
the corresponding organizational designs required for fit—are
dynamic. However, most research on organizational design
maintains a static focus [23], [24]; many scholars reject this
view of fit as static equilibrium [1], [20].
Not only must management attempt to match the best fitting
organizational form to the particular contingency set that is
obtained at any given point in time (i.e., seeking the best static
fit at each time period [41]), but it must also attempt to forecast
the contingency sets likely to be obtained at future times,
identify the corresponding best future organizational designs,
and maneuver the organization over time (i.e., seeking to obtain
the best dynamic fit across time periods). Hence, time emerges
as a central concept—one that is not addressed well by extant
theory [23], [24].
Additionally, assessing fit in such dynamic context is chal-
lenging. With multiple contingency factors in a set to address
simultaneously, the organizational design task is more complex,
and it becomes increasingly difficult to prescribe a single orga-
nizational form deemed to be most appropriate in the context of
the whole set of factors.2 Although equifinality considerations
[44], [47], [48] suggest that different organizational forms may
lead to equivalent performance under the same contingency set,
this does not imply that any form will do; some combinations
of contingency sets and organizational forms are likely to
outperform others.
Moreover, with multiple contingency factors in a set chang-
ing through time, it becomes increasingly unlikely that any
specific set of contingency factors will remain static for
long, and we understand well how organizational redesign–
reconfiguration is notably time consuming [49]. Hence, orga-
nizations are likely to spend much of their time in conditions of
misfit [41]. This highlights the importance of research focusing
on the magnitude and difficulty of correcting misfits over time.3
However, the dynamics of organizational fit/misfit and redesign
are not addressed well by extant organization and management
theory [1], [20].
2The probability of the organization being in misfit with at least one factor
is one minus the probability that the organization is in fit with all other factors
simultaneously. For instance, with probability of misfit = 0.2 and the number
of other factors = 2, this becomes 1− (0.8)2 = 0.36 (i.e., 36% chance of
misfit with at least one factor); with the number of other factors = 13, this
becomes: 1− (0.8)13 = 0.945 (95% chance of misfit with at least one factor).
3As mentioned earlier, the probability of misfit is one minus the probability
that the organization is in fit with all 14 factors simultaneously. With probability
of misfit = 0.2, this becomes: 1− (0.8)14 = 0.956 (96% chance of misfit
with at least one factor); with probability of misfit = 0.5, this becomes 1−
(0.5)14 = 0.9999 (100% chance of misfit with at least one factor).
In Table II, we summarize the principal approaches to dy-
namic conceptualization of organizational design and fit. We
begin with population ecology [50]–[52], which argues that
some organizational populations (e.g., consider select organi-
zational forms) are suited inherently better for certain ecologies
(e.g., consider environments) than others are. Further, forces of
adaptation (e.g., organizational variation, selection, and reten-
tion) work to preserve the populations exhibiting better fit and,
hence, to alter the composition of organizational ecologies over
time (e.g., with some populations destined to survive and others
destined to fail).
With this ecological view [53], the dynamics of fit are
deemed to manifest themselves via interactions between popu-
lations and their ecologies, over relatively long periods of time,
and are insulated in large part from management influence;
that is, most managers in relatively poor-fitting organizations
are destined to see their organizations fail, whereas those in
relatively well-fitting counterparts are destined to see theirs
succeed. This perspective includes negligible opportunity for
managerial intervention to address situations of misfit [54].
Alternatively, most contingency theorists maintain a teleo-
logical view [53], [55]: they see management in goal pursuit,
taking action to adjust organizational structure in order to
establish or reestablish fit. For instance, Burns and Stalker [2]
suggest that organizations in misfit are expected to modify their
structures to move into fit with their environments or other
contingencies. This is an argument for endogenous organization
change; one which suggests that organizational designs must
change longitudinally (i.e., via managerial intervention) in re-
sponse to exogenous shifts (e.g., in the environment) that cause
an organization to fall out of fit. Fit remains a static concept in
this view, however.
Similarly, set largely within a technological information-
system context, Sabherwal et al. [56] embrace the punctu-
ated equilibrium model [32], [33] to assess the alignment
between strategy and structure, and they suggest that a dy-
namic realignment pattern may persist over long periods of
time [57], [58]. Likewise, Romanelli and Tushman [34] em-
brace punctuated equilibrium also, suggesting that the large
majority of organizational transformations take place via rapid
discontinuous management-induced change. Peteraf and Reed
[59] argue further how dynamic fit represents an important
managerial capability for organizational change, highlighting
in an argument against population ecology that fit trumps
best practice. Moreover, organizational change to establish or
reestablish fit can take considerable time [49]. As earlier stated,
fitness and organizational change to establish or reestablish it
are viewed statically: The organization falls out of fit, adjusts
to regain fitness, and settles into another period of steady
equilibrium.
Hence, in this dynamic view that considers lag time, in order
to bring an organization into fit with a future and changing envi-
ronment, managers must anticipate not only the environmental
change but also the organization’s resistance to and time re-
quired to effect change. Similarly, Westerman et al. [60] discuss
how organizational designs that fit well with “early” strategic
contingencies (e.g., in the early part of the innovation life cycle)
can fall into natural misfit with “later” ones. They go further by
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TABLE II
PRINCIPAL APPROACHES TO DYNAMIC CONCEPTUALIZATION
suggesting a tension between managerial approaches; one that
requires some assessment of tradeoffs in this dynamic context:
either seek to minimize the negative effects of misfit situations
or seek to undertake timely organizational change. Burton et al.
[41] address change over time as a sequence of adjustments.
Again, as aforementioned, fitness and organizational change to
establish or reestablish it are viewed statically: The organization
falls out of fit, adjusts to regain fitness—albeit slowly—and
settles into another period of equilibrium.
Tushman and O’Reilly [61] discuss ambidextrous organi-
zations, which are able to operate simultaneously in multiple
modes. For instance, an organization may take a relatively
short-term focus on efficiency and control—essentially striving
to exploit current organization and capabilities—while simulta-
neously taking a relatively long-term focus on innovation and
risk taking—essentially striving to explore future organization
and opportunities. They describe how an organization may
even adopt multiple inconsistent architectures or structures
to pursue this approach. This maintains a static equilibrium
focus also. Although decisions and behaviors are made and
examined over different time frames (particularly, short-term
and long-term), both the short-term and long-term foci (i.e.,
both exploitation and exploration) concern static fit: Current
exploitation fits current contingencies, and future exploration
fits future contingencies.
Building upon the work of Kaufmann [62] on complex adap-
tive systems, several organization and management scholars
[20], [42], [63]–[65] discuss the fitness of organizational forms
as they adapt to changing environmental landscapes. Such land-
scapes can be characterized in terms of multiple contingencies
[e.g., production system variety, production system flexibility
(see [65])], and both external and internal fitness aspects are
considered as they affect organizational performance, which
can be viewed graphically in terms of “peaks,” reflecting com-
paratively high performance.
As the environment changes through time, the “landscape”
of peaks and valleys can shift and require an organization
to redesign and reconfigure its form, either through “local
adaptation” or “reorientation” [42, p. 945]. Relatively “smooth”
landscapes reflect “robust” organizational designs where local
adaptation through “hill climbing” can maintain relatively high
performance even with gently shifting peaks and valleys. Al-
ternatively, comparatively “rugged” landscapes require “long
jumps” across peaks [20, p. 399]. In this view, fitness land-
scapes change very slowly and reflect punctuated equilibria as
before, but the focus remains on maintaining static fit.
Along somewhat different lines, Lengnick-Hall and Beck
[66] contrast the notion of adaptive fit—essentially shifting
from one static-fit context to another over time—with robust
transformation: “a deliberately transient episodic response to
a new yet fluid equilibrium” [66, p. 742]. In this view, there
is no presumption that specific environmental conditions will
move to equilibrium; hence, organizational structures cannot
be changed to achieve static fit. This represents a departure
from most of the contingency research on fit and reinforces
the idea that organizations spend most, if not all, of their time
in conditions of misfit. Lengnick-Hall and Beck also introduce
the concept resilience capacity, which implies a capability to
recognize where objectives, such as responsiveness, flexibility,
and an expanded action repertoire, are relatively more appropri-
ate than seeking higher levels of fit over time is, along with the
capability to select and enact the corresponding routines. Notice
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that this view essentially abandons the idea of management
trying to establish or reestablish fit through organizational
design or redesign; instead, it accepts an admittedly misfitting
yet flexible organizational design.
Similarly, Brown and Eisenhardt [67] suggest that organiza-
tional semistructures, capable of balancing order and flexibility,
provide a superior approach to highly dynamic environments.
These proponents argue that continuous change represents
a more appropriate perspective than punctuated equilibrium
does. It also acknowledges the kinds of hypercompetitive (see
[68], [69]; cf., [70]) and high-velocity environments that are
in perpetual flux [71] and the kinds of nonlinear dynamic
environmental patterns that never establish equilibrium [72],
[73]. It remains unclear, however, whether fitness represents
a management goal, as in most of the approaches earlier, or
whether the goal of fitness should be abandoned in lieu of
balance (e.g., between order and flexibility).
The dynamic capability approach [74] focuses on the ability
of an organization to achieve new forms of competitive ad-
vantage (e.g., appropriate in shifting environmental conditions)
and prescribes capabilities, such as timely responsiveness, rapid
and flexible product innovation, and the management capability
to coordinate and redeploy resources as key. Important in
this approach is the concept path dependence: The options
available to an organization depend upon past choices and
events. Eisenhardt and Martin [48] augment this discussion
by relating dynamic capabilities explicitly to organizational
processes (e.g., product development, alliancing, decision mak-
ing) and indicating how market dynamism influences one’s
approach to organizing; that is, consistent with Duncan’s [12]
model, dynamism of the environment (e.g., markets, in this
case) represents an important contingency for consideration. In
what they term as “very dynamic” and “high-velocity markets”
[48, p. 1111], different dynamic capabilities (e.g., processes,
such as rapid prototyping and early testing, real-time informa-
tion, and pursuit of multiple parallel options) are required than
in their “moderately dynamic” counterparts. As with robust
transformation, multiple repertoires and scripts are called for,
and this approach discusses attempts to balance competing ef-
fects of organizing with more versus less structure: “. . . if there
were no structures, the processes would fly out of control . . .”
[48, p. 1112]. As with the unidimensional approaches summa-
rized earlier, it remains unclear how to incorporate multiple
contingencies.
All of these theoretical contributions take important steps to-
ward helping us to conceptualize fit in a dynamic context. How-
ever, each is constrained by limitations (e.g., negligible role
of management, static-equilibrium focus, abandoning fitness
as goal, and unidimensional). Moreover, it remains difficult to
understand how to link even the individual conceptualizations
directly to organizational design in a dynamic context. For
instance, when is it better to change in search of fit with
shifting contingencies or to maintain a misfit organizational
form over time? Further, there is little insight into how one
might draw from most such conceptualizations to articulate a
set of measures for empirical testing. Our research goal is to
address such limitations of extant theory and conceptualize the
design of organizations for dynamic fit. As noted previously,
we approach such goal by drawing from Aerodynamics and
airplane design to inform organizational design.
III. AERODYNAMICS CONCEPTS AND
ORGANIZATION ANALOGS
Aerodynamics [75] concerns the motion of systems designed
for flight (e.g., airplanes), most of which are highly dynamic
controlled systems; that is, the systems themselves reflect
inherent dynamic capabilities (e.g., speed, stability, maneu-
verability) that are designed in, but they receive directional
inputs (particularly from pilots) during flight (e.g., taking off,
climbing, turning). Airplane designers analyze the intended
uses (e.g., family recreation, passenger transportation, military
combat) and expected environments (e.g., clear weather, tur-
bulent storms, hostile airspace) to tailor design characteristics
and capabilities in a way that balances often-competing design
goals such as system performance, reliability, and cost. As such,
airplanes are designed deliberately to fit their intended uses
(e.g., commercial aircraft versus military fighters) and expected
environments (e.g., extreme weather versus enemy fire), and
different designs are required to fit different use-environmental
contexts; large commercial passenger jets are unable to land on
aircraft carriers nor are naval fighter jets able to carry hundreds
of passengers, for instance.
Human-activity systems, such as organizations, are not en-
gineered physical systems such as airplanes, bridges, and com-
puters, but they all represent classes of systems [25] and share
attributes [e.g., recognizable inputs, outputs, boundaries and
others (see [76])] at some level of abstraction [77]. Similar-
ities and differences between system classes such as these
have been articulated and elaborated for many decades, with
a distinction between “organizations” (particularly the kinds of
organizations discussed here) and “organisms” (e.g., the kinds
of engineered physical systems discussed here) noteworthy
[78]: “Whereas both are purposeful systems, organisms do not
contain purposeful elements. The elements of an organism may
be state maintaining, goal seeking, multigoal seeking, or pur-
posive but not purposeful. . . . In an organism, only the whole
can display will; none of the parts can” [78, p. 670]. Hence,
we can ground our discussion well in the established system-
theory literature and talk quite precisely about the goal-oriented
design of organizations and airplanes as purposeful systems
while recognizing clearly that the key elements of organizations
(i.e., people) are purposeful and have will, whereas the key
elements of airplanes (e.g., engines, wings, cockpits) do not
share such properties.
Further, we see how organizations and airplanes are open
systems [79], [80], which are engineered and managed [81].
Strategy is important in both domains [82], as organizations
and airplanes are designed purposefully to interact with their
environments in goal-seeking ways, but such systems are con-
trolled [e.g., by managers and pilots, respectively (see [83])]
both in anticipation of and reaction to shifting environmen-
tal conditions. Clearly, the degree of control that managers
have over organizations (e.g., through decision making but
particularly as composed of diverse and willful people with
partially shared but varied goals) does not compare with that
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of pilots’ ability to control airplanes (particularly as composed
of highly predictable computational, electronic, and mechanical
subsystems), so we acknowledge clear limits to the mechanistic
decision-making analogy that we draw upon.
However, this discussion is much more about the design
of organizations rather than their control. Hence, the analogy
draws much more closely on engineers (i.e., who design air-
planes) than on pilots (i.e., who fly them). Pilots do their best to
control the airplanes that engineers have designed, but (in the
short-term) they have negligible control over the designs them-
selves. Knowledge and expertise vary across these roles as well:
Most airplane pilots do not have or require engineering degrees
(e.g., they focus on airplane control) nor do most engineers have
or require piloting licenses (e.g., they focus on airplane design).
In this light, airplane designs can change over time—through
learning and decision making—in reaction to shifting needs and
conditions (e.g., changing missions, differing cost and passen-
ger constraints, invention of new materials, and technologies).
Likewise, managers do their best to control the organizations
as designed, but (in the short-term) they have negligible control
over the designs themselves. To continue the role parallel,
most organizational managers focus principally on control of
everyday operations, whereas the process of organizational
design is undertaken more by senior executives, consultants,
and the like professionals who maintain a longer term, higher
level, and more strategic perspective. In this light, organization
designs can change over time—through learning and decision
making—in reaction to shifting needs and conditions (e.g.,
changing markets, differing cost and production constraints,
invention of new processes, and technologies).
When we use the term organizational management in this
discussion, we refer to managers in a role comparable to that
of a pilot: controlling an implemented system design through
a process that takes place comparatively very quickly. When
we use the term organizational design, alternatively, we refer
to senior executives, consultants, and the like professionals in
a role comparable to that of an engineer: analyzing, specifying,
and implementing system capabilities through a specific design
point and a process that takes considerable time.
In the rest of this section, we conceptualize a basic model
and then illustrate the central dynamic concepts stability and
maneuverability through comparison of dynamic trajectories
corresponding to airplane and organization designs. Such illus-
tration provides concrete examples, stimulates insight, and en-
ables us to develop research propositions that lend themselves
to empirical testing. This section concludes with an extended
conceptual model that reflects these examples, insights, and
propositions.
A. Basic Conceptual Model
The basic conceptual model is shown in Fig. 1. Through
considerable simplification,4 the aerodynamics concepts and
4This is important, for our understanding of organizations as human sys-
tems does not support the kinds of precise mathematical representations and
corresponding analytical methods used to model, design, and analyze airplanes
and the like physical systems. Such simplification also facilitates translation of
research along these lines to the management and organization domain.
Fig. 1. Basic conceptual model.
relationships between static stability, dynamic stability, maneu-
verability, and technology are depicted in a manner that can
apply to the domains of both airplanes and organizations. We
diagram these central concepts and interrelationships as boxes
and arrows in the figure and explain them hereinafter.
Table III summarizes the four key-concept definitions and
provides examples from both the airplane and organization
domains. First, static stability, which concerns a system’s ini-
tial resistance to deviation from its dynamic trajectory from
an external force, maps from airplane design to organization
design by considering performance. A statically stable airplane
resists deviation from its intended altitude, for instance, by wind
gusts, and a statically stable organization resists deviation from
its intended profit5 level, for instance, by changed consumer
preferences. Hence, static stability limits initial performance
deviation (e.g., maintaining desired airplane altitude or main-
taining desired organization profitability).
Dynamic stability, which concerns the quickness of a sys-
tem’s return to its dynamic trajectory after deviation from an
external force, maps from airplane design to organizational de-
sign by considering performance also. A dynamically stable air-
plane returns quickly to its intended altitude, for instance, after
deviation by wind gusts, and a dynamically stable organization
returns quickly to its intended profit level, for instance, after
deviation by changed consumer preferences. Hence, dynamic
stability limits the duration of performance deviation (e.g.,
maintaining desired airplane altitude or maintaining desired
organization profitability).
Maneuverability, which concerns the quickness of a con-
trolled system’s planned change from one trajectory to another,
is inhibited by stability, and vice versa: the more stable an
airplane is, for instance, the less maneuverable it is, and the
more stable an organization, for instance, the less maneuverable
also. A maneuverable airplane can change direction or altitude,
for instance, in response to the pilot’s goal change, quickly, and
a maneuverable organization can change product line or profit
5As a note, we can substitute a multitude of alternate performance mea-
sures for airplanes (e.g., heading, speed, attitude, fuel efficiency, or passenger
comfort) or organizations (e.g., market share, cycle time, liquidity, operating
margin, or employee welfare) to emphasize model generality.
424 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS—PART A: SYSTEMS AND HUMANS, VOL. 41, NO. 3, MAY 2011
TABLE III
CONCEPT DEFINITIONS AND EXAMPLES
level, for instance, in response to the manager’s goal change
quickly as well. Hence, maneuverability limits the duration of
goal deviation (e.g., achieving a new airplane heading or alti-
tude, achieving a new organization product line or profitability).
Finally, technology can enhance control of a dynamic sys-
tem. Computerized flight-control systems, for instance, enable
pilots to control highly unstable yet maneuverable airplanes
(e.g., to maintain desired heading and altitude), and manage-
ment information systems, for instance, enable managers to
control highly unstable yet maneuverable organizations (e.g., to
maintain desired product line and profitability). Hence, technol-
ogy moderates the interrelation between maneuverability and
dynamic stability.
Technology can play other roles as well, both in terms of
the control and design of airplanes and organizations. Consider
airplane simulators, for instance, which pilots use extensively
to practice both routine and dangerous maneuvers in the safety
of ground-based computer systems, with no risk to life or
aircraft; likewise, managers can practice both routine and risky
decision making, for instance, through organizational simula-
tion systems [84], [85], with no risk to careers or profits. As
another instance, consider computer-aided design and engineer-
ing systems (CAD/CAE) that enable engineers to evaluate the
system properties and behaviors of myriad alternate airplane
designs through corresponding virtual prototypes; likewise,
virtual organization-design systems [86], [87] enable organiza-
tional designers to evaluate the system properties and behaviors
of myriad alternate organization designs through corresponding
virtual prototypes.
B. Illustrative Airplane and Organization Trajectories
The illustrative airplane and organization trajectories
delineated and described in this section provide concrete
examples derived from the basic conceptual model earlier
Fig. 2. Airplane A trajectory.
mentioned. Such examples are kept purposefully very sim-
ple (e.g., linear motion, discrete time, single variable) to il-
lustrate the key points of comparison and insights from our
airplane–organization analogy. Given the considerable sophis-
tication and empirical power of Aerospace Engineering, more
complex applications are straightforward to conceive; we leave
such conceptualization to future research.
1) Static Stability: With considerable simplification of aero-
dynamic theory, we annotate Fig. 2 to delineate a very simple
linear trajectory of an airplane (i.e., “Airplane A”) in terms
of the single variable altitude (in kilometers) over time. We
use this and the like figures in the following for analytical
description and conceptual illustration. The eight circular-plot
points in the figure delineate the airplane’s altitude at discrete
times during flight. Beginning with level flight at the goal
altitude of 4 km, the figure shows a disruption (e.g., wind shift)
that changes the airplane’s altitude from the goal to the 3-km
level. This altitude change from the goal can be viewed as a
1-km performance deviation. Static stability characterizes how
resistant airplane performance is to environmental disruptions;
despite the word “static,” this term describes a dynamic prop-
erty of airplanes (i.e., resistance to disruption). Notice that such
dynamic property is designed into the system by engineers and
has little to do with the pilots who fly them.
In this example, the magnitude of altitude change (i.e., 1-km
performance deviation) provides a basis for comparison with
the static stability of other airplane designs. An airplane that
experiences less altitude change from a particular disruption
can be said to reflect greater static stability than an airplane
which moves more (and vice versa). Indeed, an ideal system
(e.g., perfectly stable airplane) would experience no altitude
change from the disruption and, hence, not spend any time away
from the goal. The horizontal dotted line in Fig. 2 shows how
the trajectory of a perfectly stable airplane would remain at the
4-km altitude level and experience no performance deviation.
The 1-km altitude change experienced by Airplane A reflects
lesser static stability than that of an ideal system.
In terms of organizations, we annotate Fig. 3 to delineate a
very simple linear trajectory of an organization (i.e., “Organiza-
tion A”) in terms of the single variable profit (in billion dollars)
over time. The eight circular-plot points in the figure delineate
the organization’s profit at discrete times during operations.
Beginning with steady profit at the goal level of $4 billion, the
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Fig. 3. Organization A trajectory.
figure shows a disruption (e.g., changed consumer preferences)
that changes the organization’s profit from the goal to the
$3-billion level. This profit change from the goal can be viewed
as a $1-billion performance deviation. Static stability character-
izes how resistant organization performance is to environmental
disruptions.
A key insight from our airplane–organization analogy
emerges: the performance deviation associated with airplane
static stability is analogous to the manner in which many
scholars characterize the converse of organizational fit [1]:
“misfit produces a negative effect on organizational perfor-
mance” [1, p. 14]. Misfit is a deviation from the ideal or goal
state and provides a basis for comparing the relative misfit of
other organizations. An organization with greater performance
deviation (e.g., from environmental disruption) is in greater
misfit than one with lesser deviation. Hence, static stability and
misfit represent relatively good analogs (e.g., see the first row
of Table IV for summarization): The greater the static stability
of an organization is, the lesser is the performance deviation it
experiences from environmental disruption. This gives rise to
our first research propositions.
Proposition 1a: A statically stable organization will expe-
rience less performance deviation from environmental disrup-
tion than a statically unstable organization will.
Proposition 1b: The degree of static stability associated
with an organization can be quantified by the magnitude of
performance deviation it experiences with respect to the per-
formance of an ideal organization.
2) Dynamic Stability: Notice that the airplane static stabil-
ity, as shown in Fig. 2, does not take into account the time
in flight spent at an altitude below the 4-km goal. Even as a
dynamic concept, it is insensitive to how quickly the airplane
returns to its goal altitude: It addresses the magnitude of perfor-
mance deviation but does not address time. The same applies to
organization static stability shown in Fig. 3: It is insensitive to
how quickly the organization returns to its goal profit level, and
it addresses the magnitude of performance deviation but does
not address time.
In contrast, as shown in Fig. 4, dynamic stability represents
both the magnitude and duration of performance deviation
(i.e., 1 km × 5 t = 5 km · t altitude change for Airplane A)
and characterizes both how much and how long the system
performance is affected by the disruption: It measures explicitly
how quickly the system returns to its goal altitude as well as
the extent of altitude change. As stated earlier, the combined
magnitude and duration of performance deviation provides
a basis for comparison with the dynamic stability of other
airplane designs. For a given altitude change from a particular
disruption, an airplane that spends less time away from the goal
can be said to reflect greater dynamic stability. When viewed
in comparison with an ideal system (e.g., the horizontal line at
goal altitude in Fig. 4), dynamic stability can be measured as the
area between the ideal and focal system trajectories; the larger
the area is, the lesser is the dynamic stability, and vice versa.
Further, Airplane A pays something of an instability penalty:
Since it exhibits lesser dynamic stability than the ideal system
does, it spends more time away from the goal altitude and incurs
an opportunity loss during this period away from goal (e.g.,
consider burning fuel at a faster rate while at lower altitude).
When viewed in comparison with the ideal system trajectory in
Fig. 4, opportunity loss can be measured as the area between the
ideal and focal system trajectories also; the larger the area is, the
greater is the opportunity loss, and vice versa. Hence, as shown
in the figure, we can relate dynamic stability to opportunity loss.
In terms of organizations, the dynamic stability concept
incorporates time explicitly into our conceptualization. Most
directly, we can characterize dynamic stability in terms of the
combined magnitude and duration of an organization’s perfor-
mance deviation from the goal. When viewed in comparison
with an ideal organization, dynamic stability can be measured
as the area between the ideal and focal organization trajectories;
the larger the area is, the lesser is the dynamic stability.
Fig. 5 shows this conceptualization with a comparison of
trajectories between an ideal organization (i.e., represented by
the horizontal dotted line with no performance deviation from
the $4 billion goal profit level) and that of Organization A.
This graphic is identical to Fig. 3 earlier, except that we label
the static and dynamic stability explicitly for Organization
A. Specifically, we show static stability as the magnitude of
performance deviation ($1 billion) associated with the envi-
ronmental disruption at Time 1 and dynamic stability as the
area between the ideal and focal organizations’ performance
trajectories (i.e., combined magnitude and duration of devia-
tion; $1 billion × 5 = $5 billion). As in the static case earlier,
the horizontal dotted line in Fig. 5 shows how the trajectory of
an organization with perfect dynamic fit would remain at a goal
level (e.g., in terms of a $4 billion profit level) and experience
no performance deviation for all seven time periods. The lesser
dynamic stability (i.e., greater dynamic instability) exhibited by
Organization A reflects a $5 billion instability penalty, which
can be interpreted as an opportunity loss. This gives rise to our
second research propositions.
Proposition 2a: A dynamically stable organization will
experience less performance deviation from environmental dis-
ruption, through time, than a dynamically unstable organiza-
tion will.
Proposition 2b: The degree of dynamic instability and
opportunity loss associated with an organization can be quan-
tified by the magnitude and duration of performance deviation
it experiences with respect to the performance of an ideal
organization.
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SUMMARY OF KEY DYNAMIC CONCEPTS
Fig. 4. Airplane A dynamic stability.
Fig. 5. Organization a dynamic stability.
3) Maneuverability: As with the previous, we annotate
Fig. 6 to delineate the dynamic trajectory of Airplane A in
terms of altitude over time and to illustrate the concept maneu-
verability. A goal change (e.g., to avoid colliding with another
airplane) at Time 1 changes the airplane’s desired altitude from
1 km to the 4-km level, and every altitude below the new 4-km
goal can be viewed as a performance deviation that persists until
the new goal is reached (e.g., six time periods for Airplane A).
Fig. 6. Airplane A maneuverability.
Maneuverability, in this example, represents the magnitude
of altitude change that an airplane can make per unit time: the
more maneuverable an airplane is, the greater is the change
in altitude it can make in a given amount of time or the less
time it requires for a given change in altitude. As shown in the
figure, the maneuverability of Airplane A (i.e., 0.5 km/t) reflects
its ability to increase altitude by half a kilometer in each time
period. Unlike our stability examples earlier where the airplane
trajectory is disrupted externally, here we are examining what
can be done purposefully to an airplane (e.g., change altitude).
Indeed, an ideal system (e.g., perfectly maneuverable air-
plane) would make the change in altitude immediately and,
hence, not spend any time away from the new goal. This is
depicted by the ideal-system trajectory delineated in the figure;
the ideal system stays at the 1-km goal altitude through Time
1, after which, it increases to the new 4-km level immediately
after the goal change. As stated earlier, the combined magnitude
and duration of performance deviation provides a basis for
comparison with the maneuverability of other airplane designs.
For a given altitude change from one goal to another, an airplane
that spends less time away from the new goal can be said to
reflect greater maneuverability. Likewise, for a given period of
NISSEN AND BURTON: DESIGNING ORGANIZATIONS FOR DYNAMIC FIT 427
Fig. 7. Organization A maneuverability.
time away from the new goal, an airplane that effects greater
altitude change can be said to reflect greater maneuverability.
Further, Airplane A pays something of an unmaneuverability
penalty: Since it exhibits lesser maneuverability than the ideal
system does, it spends more time away from the goal altitude,
and, as previously mentioned, it incurs an opportunity loss dur-
ing this period away from the goal. When viewed in comparison
with the ideal-system trajectory in Fig. 6, opportunity loss can
be measured as the area between the ideal and focal system
trajectories; the larger the area is, the lesser is the maneuver-
ability and the greater is the opportunity loss, and vice versa.
Hence, as shown in the figure, we can relate maneuverability to
opportunity loss.
In terms of organizations, consider the maneuverability of
Organization A with its trajectory shown in Fig. 7 along with
that of the corresponding ideal organization. In this comparison,
Organization A requires six time periods to respond to a goal
change (e.g., strategy shift) at Time 1. In comparison with
the ideal organization trajectory—which reflects perfect
maneuverability—we show a $9-billion area between the
ideal and focal organizations’ performance trajectories. The
lesser maneuverability exhibited by Organization A reflects a
$9-billion unmaneuverability penalty, which can be interpreted
as an opportunity loss. This gives rise to our third research
propositions.
Proposition 3a: A maneuverable organization will be able
to change more quickly in response to strategy change than an
unmaneuverable organization will, thus incurring less opportu-
nity loss.
Proposition 3b: The degree of unmaneuverability penalty
and opportunity loss associated with an organization’s re-
sponse to strategy change can be quantified by the magnitude
and duration of performance deviation it experiences with
respect to the performance of an ideal organization.
4) Stability-Maneuverability Tradeoffs: An important trade-
off in aircraft design exists between stability and maneuver-
ability. The tradeoff is obtained because design aspects that
contribute to aircraft stability (e.g., size, front loading of
mass, rear concentration of pressure) degrade maneuverabil-
ity, and vice versa. In terms of organizations, an analogous
design tradeoff would imply that highly stable organizations
would not be particularly maneuverable, and vice versa. The
implication is that, when designing an organization to pro-
duce consistent results through environmental disruptions (i.e.,
emphasizing stability), for instance, management would have
to sacrifice some capability for rapid organizational change
(i.e., deemphasizing maneuverability). Likewise, when design-
ing an organization to enable rapid change (i.e., emphasizing
maneuverability), as a counter instance, management would
have to sacrifice some capability for robust performance (i.e.,
deemphasizing stability). This gives rise to our fourth research
propositions.
Proposition 4a: A highly stable organization will be less
maneuverable and less able to change quickly in response to
strategy change—but will incur lesser instability penalty—than
a less stable organization will.
Proposition 4b: A highly maneuverable organization will
be less stable and will incur greater instability penalty—but
will be more able to change quickly in response to strategy
change—than a less maneuverable organization will.
5) Technology: Leveraging the fundamental tradeoff noted
earlier, in today’s aerodynamics, we note the counterintuitive
trend in which modern aircraft are designed intentionally to be
inherently unstable: Unstable design enhances maneuverability.
The problem is, of course, that such unstable yet maneuverable
aircraft are exceptionally difficult to control—indeed beyond
the ability of human pilots. It is only through the active assis-
tance of technology, such as computer flight-control systems,
and with a human pilot that such aircraft can be flown at all.
In terms of organizations, substantial research addresses
the role of information technology in balancing organiza-
tional flexibility with control [48], [67], [88] through real-time
information, forecasting, marketing, product design, and
supply-chain management [56]. Organizational instability
through design, combined with analogous “flight-control” man-
agement processes and information technology [89], [90], may
lead to greater maneuverability and may be essential for highly
maneuverable organizations to be controlled at all. This gives
rise to our fifth research propositions.
Proposition 5a: A highly maneuverable organization must
be designed to be unstable but can be controlled more effec-
tively with management information technologies than maneu-
verable organizations without such technologies.
Proposition 5b: The comparative unmaneuverability penalty
and opportunity loss associated with a highly maneuverable or-
ganization’s use of management information technologies can
be quantified by the magnitude and duration of performance
deviation it experiences with respect to the performance of the
same organization without such technologies.
C. Extended Conceptual Model
At this point in the discussion, we have sufficient conceptual
grist and organizational analogs to outline an extended con-
ceptual model that reflects the research propositions summa-
rized previously. In particular, summarizing from the extended
discussion, we identify the magnitude of performance devia-
tion as key to empirical measurement of static stability, the
combination of magnitude and time for dynamic stability, and
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Fig. 8. Extended conceptual model.
the rate of change for maneuverability. Although it does not
generate a straightforward approach to measurement, we also
identify information technology as central to the technology
concept, and we include both instability and unmaneuverabil-
ity penalties—and their corresponding opportunity losses—in
Fig. 8 as well.
This figure—and the extended conceptual model—is clearly
very similar to its Fig. 1 counterpart—and the basic conceptual
model. However, several aspects of our theoretical extension
and extended conceptual model are evident. For instance, in the
extended conceptual model, we include operationalized con-
structs that suggest an approach to empirical measurement of
key concepts (e.g., measure static stability through magnitude
of performance deviation). We further identify penalties (e.g.,
instability penalty) and corresponding opportunity losses in
terms of dynamic stability and maneuverability, and we include
an explicit focus on information technology to enhance man-
agement control over organizations. This extended conceptual
model, particularly with its operationalized constructs, outlines
a theory-based framework for empirical testing.
IV. EXTENDING EXTANT THEORY
Here, we discuss our consistency with and extension to
extant theory. We first use a succinct table to summarize the
key dynamic concepts developed earlier. We then connect our
research propositions to some exemplars from the literature to
address the consistency of our conceptualization with extant
theory and to summarize our principal extensions thereto.
A. Key Dynamic Concepts
Table IV summarizes the key dynamic concepts and helps
us to enfold our theoretical comparison and extension into the
extant literature. Each of the three key dynamic concepts is
listed in the first column with its relation to extant theory noted
in the second. For instance, as noted earlier, static stability and
misfit appear to be relatively good analogs, as static stability
is consistent with long-standing and current conceptualizations
of fit; however, static stability does not pertain to static equi-
librium, and this concept provides us with an ability to assess
the degree of stability in terms of magnitude of performance
deviation.
The third column summarizes the impetus for change and
reflects static stability in terms of exogenous shocks or dis-
ruptions. The column for construct measure summarizes how
each concept could be quantified, and its counterpart in Column
5 highlights the corresponding management role. For instance
with static stability, the concept could be measured as the
magnitude of performance deviation from the goal, and the
corresponding management role is to maintain consistent per-
formance with respect to current goals. In Column 6, a few
exemplars from the literature are listed for each concept, and
the entries in Column 7 link the aforementioned propositions to
each concept.
B. Consistency With Extant Theory
Our conceptualization is very consistent with extant theory.
First, the central premises of Contingency Theory (particularly,
that no single approach to organizing is best in all circum-
stances; that poor organizational fit degrades performance; and
that many diverse organizational structures, forms, configu-
rations and other groupings have been theorized to enhance
fit across an array of contingency factors) remain consistent
with our dynamic perspective [2]; nothing in our conceptual-
ization would offer cause to question such central theoretical
premises.
Second, organizational fit remains consistent with our per-
spective, particularly in terms of static stability, which exhibits
several aspects of consistency with misfit [23]. Presumably,
based on our conceptualization of static stability, the misfit
concept could be viewed more in terms of dynamic reaction
to environmental disruption than a departure from static equi-
librium, and the degree of misfit could be measured in terms
of magnitude of performance deviation. These represent rela-
tively minor refinements. Hence, our theoretical work falls well
within the rubric of Contingency Theory. Donaldson [1] states
the fit concept succinctly: a match between the organization
structure and the environment for positive performance. As
summarized in the Introduction, there is a very large literature
which uses this basic idea. Proposition 1 points to static stability
and could be linked to organizational misfit.
In terms of dynamic stability, our conceptualization re-
veals both similarities and differences with other theoreti-
cal contributions that have been made over the past several
decades. Consistent with punctuated equilibrium [34], for in-
stance, our dynamic perspective considers that organizational
transformations may be required following rapid discontinuous
environmental change. As equilibria are punctuated with in-
creasing frequency [59], as another instance, or as dynamic
multicontingency contexts move toward continuous unpre-
dictable change [66], management finds it increasingly difficult
to obtain the best dynamic fit across time periods [60]. Al-
though our conceptualization of dynamic stability draws upon
a different more dynamic metaphor than fit—and can be opera-
tionalized with our area measure of performance deviation (and,
hence, opportunity loss) across time—presumably, it could be
viewed in terms of dynamic misfit across time.
NISSEN AND BURTON: DESIGNING ORGANIZATIONS FOR DYNAMIC FIT 429
Further, such conceptualization provides an approach to as-
sessing the relative merits of alternate techniques to achieve or-
ganizational ambidexterity [61] through concepts and measures
that incorporate time explicitly and directly. Characterizing
organizational designs in terms of balances between order and
flexibility [67] or dynamic capabilities [74] highlights the ex-
plicit temporal focus of dynamic stability, as designs reflecting
different degrees of balance or capabilities will reflect different
dynamic stability levels with the corresponding dynamic insta-
bility penalties and opportunity losses.
Additionally, in terms of fitness landscapes [20], [42], [63]–
[65] although our conceptualization draws upon a different
more dynamic metaphor than landscape, several correspon-
dences can be seen. For instance, our static and dynamic sta-
bility concepts, which characterize an organization’s resistance
to and recovery from performance deviations resulting from
exogenous shocks, correspond relatively well with the kinds
of smooth fitness landscapes that reflect robust organizational
designs; performance is relatively insensitive to environmen-
tal shifts. Indeed, our instability-penalty and opportunity-loss
concepts could be viewed in terms of how rugged a fitness
landscape appears, and our operationalization (i.e., area beneath
the ideal-organization trajectory) may provide a means for
developing an empirical measure of “ruggedness.”
Likewise, our maneuverability concept, which characterizes
an organization’s ability to change through redesign, exhibits
some correspondence to an organization’s ability to make
long jumps across fitness peaks. Indeed, as mentioned earlier,
our unmaneuverability-penalty and opportunity-loss concepts
could be viewed in terms of how capable of change an orga-
nization may be, and our operationalization (i.e., area beneath
the ideal organization trajectory) may provide a means for
developing an empirical measure of such capability.
Finally, answering calls from the literature for more dynamic
perspective [24], time emerges as a central concept of dynamic
stability, which we address in an inherently dynamic manner
as opposed to sequences of static changes [41]. Proposition 2
points directly to dynamic stability and its link to dynamic-
instability penalties and opportunity losses.
In terms of maneuverability, our conceptualization reveals
both similarities and differences with other theoretical con-
tributions that have been made over the past several decades
also. Consistent with population ecology [50], for instance,
our dynamic perspective considers time explicitly. However, in
supporting organizational design as a rational undertaking [54],
our conceptualization is teleological in nature [53], identify-
ing a critical role for management to maneuver organizations
through purposeful design changes [2], [7], [91]. Likewise, as
another instance, organizational maneuverability is consistent
with the idea that management might benefit from moving their
organizations purposefully out of fit at some points in time [41],
[49], [60], either in reaction to or in anticipation of different
times and contingencies. Indeed, our concept maneuverability
addresses explicitly the capability of an organization to undergo
design changes at various rates.
Further, we understand how conditions of misfit can be
obtained endogenously as well as result from exogenous dis-
ruptions. Deliberate management-induced disruptions—such as
through strategic choice [35]–[37], [41], cultural change [38],
and organizational change [39], [40]—can cause dynamic-
performance change (misfit) and opportunity loss as great as
those stemming from environmental shifts. Maneuverability
characterizes the ability of management to change the organi-
zation deliberately over time (e.g., seeking to seize emerging
strategic opportunities across time periods).
Likewise, the kinds of multiple repertoires and scripts called
for to maneuver organizations through very dynamic high-
velocity markets [48] are entirely consistent with organizational
maneuverability, as is the kind of balancing [92] or rebalancing
[93] required to restore fit when an organization loses its
balance. Moreover, our conceptualization of maneuverability
includes an approach to operationalization through an area
measure related to unmaneuverability penalty and opportunity
loss. Such measure could apply well to assess the degree of
balance and rebalance articulated through work along these
lines. Proposition 3 points directly to maneuverability and its
link to unmaneuverability penalty and opportunity loss.
In terms of maneuverability also, we go further by articulat-
ing a fundamental design tradeoff between stability and maneu-
verability. With some parallel to the ambidextrous organization
[61], we view organizations as integrated designs, with no
theoretical restriction to single-mode operation. However, our
fundamental design tradeoff between stability and maneuver-
ability would assert some limits on the kinds of ambidexterity
any given organization would be capable of. Such design limits
would apply to resilience capacity [66], edge organizations
[87], [94], and dynamic capabilities [48], [74] as well. Indeed,
designing an organization for maneuverability—as opposed to
stability—would represent an explicit design goal with con-
strained alternatives. Proposition 4 points directly to maneuver-
ability and its tradeoff with stability.
Additionally, given that maneuverability requires tradeoff
with stability in our conceptualization, the kinds of organiza-
tional semistructures [67]—which seek to balance order with
chaos and to keep organizational processes from flying out
of control—appear to support such tradeoff between stability
and maneuverability. Perhaps we can understand this tradeoff
better by examining product development, alliancing, decision
making, and other organizational processes [48] to understand
the role of flight-control management information technology
(e.g., leveraging real-time information systems, supply-chain
management systems, forecasting models) as means to en-
hance the control of maneuverable-but-unstable organizations.
Proposition 5 points directly to how management information
technology offers promise to enhance stability of highly ma-
neuverable organizations.
C. Extensions to Extant Theory
Our conceptualization extends extant theory as well. The
conceptual model proposed earlier articulates a number of
concepts (e.g., static stability, dynamic stability, maneuverabil-
ity) and interrelationships (e.g., respective effects on perfor-
mance deviation, instability penalty, unmaneuverability penalty
and opportunity loss; stability–maneuverability tradeoffs; and
management information-technology moderation) that extend
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beyond the body of current Contingency Theory. They also
provide a basis for examining the dynamics of contingent
organizational design in a different light and through a different
inherently dynamic metaphor—one that comes with concise
and coherent dynamical language and integrated system of con-
cepts, definitions, and interrelationships from Aerodynamics—
and reveals new insights into organizational design. Further,
the associated propositions provide the basis for empirical
examination, particularly as our measures for static stability,
dynamic stability, and maneuverability (and the associated
penalty and opportunity losses) offer a preliminary approach to
operationalizing constructs for examining testable hypotheses.
Returning again to Table IV, in terms of dynamic stability,
this concept is new to organization and management sciences,
as it incorporates time explicitly and limits instability penalty
and opportunity loss. As with static stability, the impetus
for change stems from exogenous shocks or disruptions, but
distinct from its static counterpart, the construct measure for
dynamic stability includes both magnitude and duration of per-
formance deviation from goal; one can calculate the area under
the curve for an ideal-organization trajectory. Also, somewhat
distinct from static stability, the focus of management is to
recover quickly from exogenous shocks or disruptions, but both
concepts share maintaining consistent performance with respect
to current goals as a key management role.
In terms of maneuverability, this concept is new also, as it in-
corporates time explicitly and limits unmaneuverability penalty
and opportunity loss. Maneuverability also makes explicit the
design tradeoff with stability: Maneuverability and stability are
mutually inhibiting. Maneuverability differs from both stability
concepts, as its impetus for change stems from endogenous
goal change. The construct measure for maneuverability is very
similar to that for dynamic stability, however, as it includes
both magnitude and duration of performance deviation from
goal, and one can calculate the area under the curve for an
ideal-organization trajectory; the key difference is that, ma-
neuverability pertains to performance deviations resulting from
endogenous goal changes, whereas dynamic stability pertains
to exogenous shocks and disruptions. Also, distinct from both
static and dynamic stability, the focus of management is to
move quickly to new goals; such focus, however, is comparable
with much extant theory, as it amounts to the speed at which
management can redesign and change an organization to reach
new goals.
Further, our conceptualization of static and dynamic stability
goes well beyond the static equilibrium-focused theoretical and
analytical scope of fit/misfit as a concept, and our conceptual-
ization of maneuverability links organizational redesign with
opportunity loss in an explicitly dynamic context. With such
extension, we can look beyond whether an organization is in
comparably good fit at any point in time: by understanding and
visualizing the design and performance trajectory through time;
by examining contingent organizational design as an inherently
dynamic activity; by recognizing misfit as the most likely con-
dition of most organizations; by incorporating time as a central
concept; and by interrelating organizational design, stability,
maneuverability, and opportunity loss both conceptually and
in terms of measurable constructs. This novel capability helps
one to answer calls in the literature [23], [24] to address the
inherent dynamics associated with Contingency Theory and
organizational design.
V. CONCLUSION
Fit represents a central concept for organizational design,
but extant research maintains a static focus on fit, a focus that
is incommensurate with the fundamentally dynamic nature of
organizations and their environments. Most key organizational
environments are inherently dynamic; hence, the corresponding
organizational designs required for fit are necessarily dynamic
too. The problem is, the dynamics of fit are not addressed well
by extant theory in organization and management sciences.
Alternatively, organizations can be viewed as systems of pur-
poseful design, and designing organizations to maintain fit and
respond to dynamic environments over time may be informed
well by theory and practice in engineering fields where such
design is well established.
In this paper, we abstract to the level of airplane de-
sign, and we utilize the dynamical language and integrated
system of concepts, definitions, and interrelationships from
the engineering field Aerodynamics to extend organization
and management science and address the problem of orga-
nizational design in a dynamic context. We begin with a
focused summary of the literature regarding the nature of
organizational fitness. We then outline a conceptual model
adapted to organizational design from Aerodynamics, and
we summarize the key aerodynamics concepts stability and
maneuverability to inform our conceptualization in terms of
both airplane and organization design. This work enables us to
articulate a set of propositions and measures that form a basis
for empirical testing. This work also reveals important, dynamic
organizational design tradeoffs and implications, and it shows
how such conceptualization can elucidate new insights via com-
parison with and extension to extant theory—in engineering as
well as organization and management sciences.
Our dynamic conceptualization has resulted in a conceptual
model and five research propositions that both conform to and
extend extant theory. For instance, we relate static stability by
analogy to misfit and operationalize the corresponding construct
as the magnitude of performance deviation. Likewise, through
dynamic stability, we incorporate time explicitly, conceptualize
instability penalty and opportunity loss, and operationalize
the corresponding construct as the combined magnitude and
duration (i.e., an area measure) of performance deviation.
Moreover, maneuverability incorporates time explicitly also
and relates directly to conceptualization of unmaneuverability
penalty and opportunity loss, with operationalization of the
corresponding construct through a similar area measure.
The model and its propositions point to new organizational
design considerations, tradeoffs, and role of management
information technology to provide stability and control to
highly maneuverable organizations.
As with any study, there are limits to how much progress can
be articulated in a single paper such as this, but the conceptual-
ization presented here offers potential to open up a whole new
avenue of future research along the lines of this investigation. In
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particular, all of the concepts and relationships presented in our
conceptual model call for further elaboration and refinement,
and as noted earlier, they merit empirical testing as well. As
another limitation, we draw upon only a limited set of literature
that could be used to conceptualize dynamic fit. Addressing
organizations as “living systems” [95] for instance, may
offer potential to expand the insights generated through our
airplane analogy and Aerospace-engineering adaptation to the
domain of organizational design. Likewise, as noted previously,
decision making is fundamental to organizational management
and design; hence, the extensive decision theory and decision
support literatures [96] could shed additional metaphorical
light on the dynamic-fit phenomenon as well. We leave such
expansion through other literatures to future research.
Additionally, the conceptual model also lends itself to
computational modeling and analysis (e.g., via simulation),
and the research propositions may generate a campaign of
computational, laboratory, and even field experimentation, as
researchers strive to understand the extent and limits of or-
ganizational stability, maneuverability, and opportunity loss
associated with organizational design in the context of dynamic
contingencies. To summarize, the contribution of this paper is
clearly limited, but we hope that it will be noteworthy and
constructive and that it will generate new streams of research
in organization and management theory. Further, as engineers
venture increasingly into the organization and management
domain, it will become increasingly important to understand,
appreciate, and account for such systemic contrasts. The orga-
nization and management sciences literature provides abundant
insight toward this end.
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